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THE ZEN OF CORPORATE CAPITAL
STRUCTURE NEUTRALITY
Herwig J. Schlunk*
It is well understood that corporate capital structure affects tax
collections. Most basically, corporate interest expense is deductible.
With each interest accrual, the corporate tax base shrinks. Thus, there
is a broad range of circumstances in which corporate managers are en
couraged by the Internal Revenue Code ( the "Code" ) to load their
corporate capital structures with debt. But there is little support for
the proposition that Con ress desires corporations to adopt such debt
laden capital structures. Indeed, much tax legislation suggests con
gressional displeasure with the achievable degree of corporate self2
mtegration.

p

•

•

On the other hand, corporate equity has its charms: shareholders
are able to defer their gains essentially forever. Thus, in some circum
stances the Code encourages corporate managers to load their corpo
rate capital structures with equity. Based on the numerous provisions
in the Code that depress the relative tax cost of equity, it is probably
safe to conclude that Congress is more sanguine about equity than it is
3
4
about debt. But periodically, Congress tempers its enthusiasm. And
academicians as a group find the feature of equity deferral - the re
alization requirement - quite troubling. 5
Given the current tax rate structure - where the marginal tax rate
of some persons exceeds the corporate tax rate and the marginal tax
rate of others is exceeded by it - corporations are generally well ad*
Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1981, M.A. 1982, M.B.A.
1986, J.D. 1990, University of Chicago. I want to thank Calvin Johnson, Michael Knoll,
David Weisbach and the members of the Vanderbilt Law School faculty for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. All remaining errors are my own.

1. As explained in Part VII below, the mere existence of a corporate interest deduction
does not provide adequate support.

2. In the case of corporate interest expense deductions, see I.RC. §§ 163(e)(5), 163(j),
163(1), and 279 (West Supp. 2000). In other contexts, see § 311(b), repealing General Utilities
v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), and § 355(e), repealing Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367
F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966), and the recent expansions of § 1059.

3. See, e.g., I.RC. §§ 351, 354-356, 368 (granting nonrecognition treatment to various
types of exchanges); § 1014 (making nonrecognition permanent for those who die); § l(h)
(making recognition less painful for those who are forced to recognize).

4. See, e.g., I.RC. § 302 (treating certain redemptions as giving rise to ordinary income);
§ 1091 (limiting the artificial acceleration of certain losses). In addition, there are many re
strictions placed by the Code on nonrecognition. See, e. g., §§ 305(c), 351(g).

5. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
167 (1991); see also Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial In
struments, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 243 (1992).
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vised to employ both debt and equity in their capital structures. The
former will be held by low tax rate taxpayers and will serve to lower
6
the effective aggregate tax rate on the corporation's taxable income.
The latter will be held by high tax rate taxpayers and will serve to keep
low the effective aggregate tax rate on the corporation's unrecognized
economic income (such as any increase in the value of corporate as
sets, including goodwill). From the vantage of the Fisc, this is, of
course, the worst of all possible worlds.
This Article does not propose to do away with the infirmities of the
current corporate tax regime by abolishing double taxation. For while
7
Code § 11 may be the step child of federal income tax theory, there
8
currently appears to be no realistic prospect to repeal it. At least in
the case of publicly traded corporations - the most important class of
double-taxed entities - Americans tend to view them either as a free
good, which can be taxed with economic impunity, or as a proxy for
the faceless rich, who are undertaxed in any event. Perhaps this will
change in time, as the proliferation of 401(K) plans turns the hoards of
middle class taxpayers into capitalists. But a change seems to be yet a
good way off. And in any event, as I argue below, integration - at
least in its commonly proposed forms - would not necessarily cure all
that ails the current corporate tax system.
Thus, this Article takes double taxation as a given and as a chal
lenge. It asks how, if at all, a double tax regime can be designed so that
economic actors are powerless to use capital structure to influence tax
collections. The linchpin to the answer, set forth in Part VI below, is
that the Code cannot allow any nontrivial corporate deduction with
respect to any returns earned by any corporate capital providers. In
particular, and merely as one example, the corporate deduction for in
9
terest expense must be abolished.

6. The "aggregate" tax rate includes both the corporate rate and any relevant interest
holder tax rates.

7. That no academician seriously supports it is amply demonstrated by the ever
continuing spate of integration proposals. See Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to
Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265
(1995); Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 24 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 493 (1998); George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic
Ideal, 47 TAX L. REV. 431 (1992).

8. Not even the managers of publicly held corporations, who would seem to be the most
natural proponents of such repeal, show much support for the idea. Perhaps this is because
integration would put pressure on such corporations to pay out more to shareholders than
currently is their wont, and this would reduce the size of managerial fiefdoms.
9. Other scholars have, of course, long argued for the abolition of the corporate interest
deduction. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy
Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 1603 (1974). More recently, as part of its Comprehensive
Business Income Tax Prototype, the Treasury Department similarly proposed repealing the
corporate interest deduction. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TIIE TREASURY, INTEGRATION
OF INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 39, 40
(1992).
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One immediate obj ection to such a suggestion is that it cannot
adequately take into account the special needs of corporate financial
intermediaries whose business it is, at least in part, to own highly lev
eraged interests in other corporations. Without interest deductions, so
the argument goes, financial intermediation can not be profitable, and
without such intermediation, capital deployment in the economy will
become less efficient, with calamitous results. Although I leave to a
subsequent article the full exposition of this problem, the short answer
is that it need not be so. The question is indeed no different from any
other question of consolidation - that is, the proper treatment of cor
porate capital instruments held by other corporations - and has,
when so viewed, several relatively straightforward solutions.
A more powerful obj ection to my suggestion is that, given political
reality and public choice, a capital structure neutral tax regime will
never be enacted. Thus, the best one is likely to observe is a movement
away from current inefficiencies toward future inefficiencies or, more
bluntly, the replacement of one set of arbitrary and irrational lines
with another. Whenever only a partial solution to an existing problem
is possible, the relevant policy question must be whether there is a net
gain from implementing that partial solution, taking into account that
10
there will be both gains and losses. I do not dwell on such tradeoffs
because the goal of this Article is merely to provide a theoretical char
acterization of capital structure neutral tax regimes, not an ordering of
second best non-capital structure neutral tax regimes.
Part I demonstrates how corporate capital structure can affect tax
collections. It defines as "capital structure neutral" a tax regime in
which corporate capital structure does not affect tax collections. Part
II argues that a capital structure neutral tax regime is desirable. Part
III shows that integrated corporate tax regimes are not necessarily
capital structure neutral. Part IV gives some examples of possible capi
tal structure neutral tax regimes. Part V develops a theoretical decon
struction of any corporate tax regime. This deconstruction forms the
basis for the general description of all capital structure neutral tax re
gimes. Part VI is the proof that any capital structure neutral tax regime
must have a certain form. Part VII describes some implications and, in
particular, demonstrates that in a world with multiple interest holder
tax rates, a corporate deduction for interest expense is incompatible
with capital structure neutrality. Part VIII is a brief conclusion.
PART I - AN EXAMPLE AND A DEFINITION

Assume that the world is governed by certainty: cash flows and
changes in the fair market value of assets are all certain. Reality, of

10.

See David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 29

J. LEGAL STUD.

71 (2000).
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course, differs from this assumption. Nonetheless, the assumption is
useful because it will make the examples that follow tractable. More
over, the points illustrated hold under uncertainty as well. Any tax re
gime that cannot pass muster under the assumption of certainty does
not have a chance in the more complex world of uncertainty.

I focus on a single corporation, X. Economically, X is owned in
proportions of equal value by two interest holders, A and B. However,
the legal form which A's and B's ownership interests will take is a
variable to be determined.
I also focus on only a single period. This can be j ustified in part in
that the collection of income taxes has historically been periodic. But
more, it is a nod to the fact that once a tax code permits the tax on
economic income to be deferred for even one year, it will generally be
powerless to prevent subsequent replications of the deferral. The end
result is that the tax, which is ultimately paid in the distant future, will
have an arbitrarily low net present value. Thus, for modeling purposes,
the tax rate in all periods but the present is assumed to be zero.
The tax rates imposed on X, A, and B are variables. They will be
set so as to allow the Fisc to collect

$50

of tax directly or indirectly

from the X business in a base case. The only arbitrary constraint I im
pose is that the tax rate on income taxed to A will be four times the
tax rate on income taxed to B. This allows A to serve as a proxy for
high-income taxpayers, and B as a proxy for low-income or tax-exempt
taxpayers.
Finally, I assume that each of A and B invests

$1000 in

the X busi

ness and that, in the year in question, X generates cash flow of $200
and what I shall call "capital-structure-independent" taxable income
of $100. In addition, during the year, the X assets actually increase in
value by $200, rather than depreciating by $100 as implied by the dif
ference between cash flow and taxable income.

Base Case: Common Equity with Current Payout
Assume X intends to distribute annually all net taxable income
(that is, taxable income remaining after payment of taxes). Under cur
rent tax principles, X would be taxed on $100 of corporate taxable in
come. The Fisc would like to tax a certain amount of income "at the
source," and so imposes a 33.33% tax rate on corporate income. (This
rate is arbitrarily chosen (the first variable to be fixed); a different rate
will simply require different shareholder rates.) Thus, the Fisc collects
$33.33 of tax. If X indeed distributes the $66.67 of net income
$33.33 each to A and B - the Fisc will need to impose additional
shareholder-level taxes on A and B at rates of 40% and 10% , respec
tively, to achieve its stated aggregate tax collection obj ective of $50.

-
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First Variation: Deferral
One way that A and B can keep at least a part of the Fisc's in
tended take is simply to have X retain its after-tax income. That saves
$16.67 of tax. While this is particularly effective under the instant facts
--,...- where future tax rates drop to zero - it is in fact an opportunity
whenever the effective tax rate on implicit reinvestment in a business,
by having such business retain its earnings, is lower than the effective
tax rate of explicit reinvestment in the business (where interest holders
receive distributions and must affirmatively reinvest them - after
.
) 11
paymg tax, of course .

Second Variation: Base Erosion
A and B are no fools. Thus, they each structure their ownership in
terests in X as partially debt - say $500 of debt accruing interest at a
10% rate. This generates an aggregate $100 of interest deductions for
X, which zeroes out X's income and, of course, its payment to the Fisc.
Since X has no taxable income, it distributes no net income to its
shareholders. It does, however, pay $50 of interest to each of A and B .
A pays $20 of tax on this interest; B pays $5 o f tax. The Fisc collects
only $25 of tax.

Third Variation: More Base Erosion
A and B are not done. As a further iteration, A's entire interest is
transmuted into a participating preferred stock (which is common
stock for tax purposes) with an accruing 10% preferred return prior to
11. As in the example in the text, assume that X can always earn a 5% taxable return on
its assets. But ignore for the moment any other economic earnings; assume that 5% is all
there is. Additionally, assume the fiction of having only a single year taxed is abolished, and
that tax rates are invariant from one year to the next. Rather than focussing on one tax year,
I now focus on two.
In year 1, X earns $100 and pays $33.33 of tax. If it holds onto its earnings and profits
("e&p"), X has an additional $66.67 earning 5% in year 2. Thus, in year 2, it earns $103.33.
Paying tax at its 33.33% rate leaves it $68.89 to distribute, in addition to the $66.67 retained
from year 1. Thus, $135.56 flows out to A and B, and they pay tax on this at their blended
rate of 25%. They are thus left with $101.67.
If instead X distributes its e&p annually, A and B pay $16.67 of tax in year 1, and thus
have only $50 to reinvest in X. Thus, in year 2, X earns $102.50 and generates $68.33 of e&p.
When X distributes this amount to A and B, they pay 25% tax on it and so are left with
$51.25. Plus, they are entitled to a tax-free return of the $50 of capital they invested just be
fore the beginning of year 2. Thus, they have $101.25 when the dust settles, which is less than
in the case of implicit reinvestment.
The reason for the disparity is the same one that makes tax-free savings accounts IRAs, 401(K)s, and the like - so taxpayer friendly. As in those cases, A and B have avoided
a tax on what could have been current income, have reinvested such amount "tax-free," and
only pay the piper once the amount is withdrawn from their "tax-free" account. Only here
the account is not entirely tax-free: it is burdened with corporate income tax. But it is tax
free from A's and B's vantage, for it defers their individual liabilities.

November 2000]

Capital Structure Neutrality

415

pari passu treatment with any (other) common stock. In turn, B's en

tire interest is transmuted into a convertible debt instrument yielding
10% before conversion into common stock. Assuming X can success
fully avoid Code Section 163(1) and similar provisions, X's taxable in
come is again zeroed out with interest expense, but now the entirety of
the corresponding interest income is taxed to B (without, however,
diminishing A's economic interest in any way). The Fisc's collections
now shrink to $10.
The iterations in this example demonstrate that, under the current
corporate tax regime, taxpayers can - solely through the expedient of
varying capital structure - reduce the amount of tax collected by the
Fisc. 12 In the terminology of this Article, the corporate tax regime is
.
not capital structure neutra18
.
I define a scheme of corporate and interest-holder taxation to be
capital structure neutral if corporate managers are powerless to design
capital structures that systematically affect the aggregate tax collected
by the Fisc directly or indirectly from such corporation. 14 This does not
necessarily mean that the Fisc's expected tax collections from any one
corporation will be fixed. Such collections may vary based on the tax
rate mix of such corporation's interest holders. Thus, if all interests in
one corporation are fortuitously held by tax-exempt investors, while
all interests in an otherwise identical corporation are held by high tax
rate investors, the Fisc will collect more tax directly and indirectly
from the latter. But so long as the selection of investments by investors
is truly fortuitous - so long as each corporation's managers cannot by
design steer their corporation's capital interests into the hands of in
vestors of any particular tax rate - the Fisc should be unconcerned by
such variation. Economy-wide it will be fully protected: capital instru
ments of every type will be held on average by the average investor.
There are two distinct ways that managers can currently try to sys
tematically alter - that is, reduce - the tax collections directly or in
directly from their corporations. First, they can create capital instru
ments that have inherent features that reduce tax collections. Thus, for
12. If B were permitted to have a 0% tax rate - that is, to be a tax exempt person - the
tax collections from the X business could be eliminated entirely.

13. Of course, taxpayers have a myriad of concerns, unrelated to tax, that affect their
capital structure choices. In rare circumstances, these concerns may limit the ability to effec
tively manage capital structure from a tax perspective. More commonly, however, skillful
drafting will permit nontax concerns to be addressed in instruments otherwise designed
purely with tax in mind in such a way as not to alter the desired tax effect.

14. For purposes of this Article, capital structure does not merely take debt and equity
into account, but includes all manner of financial instruments (even ones which do not nomi
nally involve direct investment, such as derivatives). It further includes certain relationships
- for example, employment relationships and leasing - that allow the interest holder (the
counterparty) to participate in the success or lack thereof of the corporate business. Herwig
J. Schlunk, Do We Really Need Nonqualified Preferred Stock? A Rethinking of the Taxation
of Corporate Capital, 77 TAXES 64, 64-91 (1999) [hereinafter Schlunk, NQPS].
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example, a corporation with positive taxable income may wish to issue
a current-pay capital instrument with a given set of economic terms. If
the corporation structures this instrument to be tax debt, then the tax
collections by the Fisc will be lower than if the corporation structures
the instrument to be tax equity (due to the corporation's interest de
duction). Or, as a second example, a corporation without taxable in
come, but with plenty of economic income, may wish to issue a non
current-pay instrument with a given set of economic terms. If an
instrument is structured to be tax equity, then the tax collections by
the Fisc will be lower than if it is structured to be tax debt (due to a
holder's not needing to accrue any yield into taxable income on a cur
rent basis).
The second way that managers can try systematically to reduce tax
collections is by creating instruments that provide either the entity or
its interest holders with an embedded option to do post-issuance tax
planning. For example, under the Code, a corporation's decision to re
deem an instrument or an interest holder's decision to sell it will gen
erally affect tax collections. A capital structure neutral tax regime
would not give taxpayers the ability to exploit post-issuance tax oppor
tunities (and conversely would not burden taxpayers with the need to
avoid post-issuance tax traps).
PART II- WHY CAPITAL STRUCTURE NEUTRALITY?

Why should one care about capital structure neutrality? I have said
a bit about this elsewhere.15 Essentially, three points need to be made.
The first is practical; the second is economic; the third is political. A
fourth point - that tax regimes should be aesthetic and that this one is
not- I will not belabor.
The first point is brief. A corporate tax is presumably intended to
accomplish at least one thing: the raising of revenue. That there may
be other or better ways to raise revenue is beside the point. However,
as the example in Part I illustrates, the ability of a corporate tax to
raise revenue may be severely impeded when a tax regime is not capi
tal structure neutral. Accordingly, capital structure neutrality is desir
able.16
The second point is that, as an economic matter, any number of in
efficiencies and transaction costs creep into a tax regime that allows
15. Id.

16. Even a tax regime that is not capital structure neutral - for example, ours - can
and does raise tax revenues from corporations. Tax planners can and do set tax rates that
take into account taxpayer attempts to avoid the corporate tax. But there is a constant game
of cat and mouse, action and reaction. And, hence, a periodic need to either adjust rates or
to protect the tax base from excessive diminution. A capital structure neutral regime would
allow the government to set tax rates in a more straightforward and a more transparent
manner.
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tax collections to be manipulated based on capital structure. First and
foremost, distortions can and will arise - relative to the baseline of
any capital structure neutral regime - on questions as basic as "who
will win the economic game."1 7 Indeed, the current competition among
corporate tax managers to engage in so-called corporate tax shelters
(many of which, in fairness, are not based on capital structure ma
nipulations) powerfully illustrates the perceived ability of a tax system
to have just such unintended real economic effects. In addition, a tax
regime that encourages debt financing (or certain other financing with
tax-deductible returns) increases economy-wide bankruptcy costs. 18
Finally, the. tax advantages of debt financing can affect the types of
projects that a corporation will accept. For example, projects with
lower expected value but also with lower variance of returns are more
effectively subsidized by the corporate interest deduction.19
In addition, the actual racing to the bottom - the zeroing out of
corporate income and tax - has direct costs. To stay competitive, cor
porations must expend considerable amounts hiring professionals to
craft ways to reduce their tax burdens. These professionals tend not to
be dullards; if focused on socially useful activities it is anyone's guess
how much social output would increase.20 In addition to the cost of
brainpower, efforts craftily to minimize taxes also spawn a host of
administrative-type costs. For example, structuring a capital instru
ment to accomplish various not wholly consistent economic and tax re17. Ignoring taxes, a producer of a good or service in a competitive market can generally
reduce his production costs only by reducing his consumption of various inputs of produc
tion. Reducing such consumption is a social good, for society can presumably put the saved
and valuable inputs to other use. But if the producer finds a way to pay Jess tax, there is no
similar resource windfall to society. Indeed, so long as the government's revenue require
ments have not changed, the producer has accomplished nothing at all save the imposition of
incremental taxes on someone else.
Under certain assumptions, an argument can be made that a producer who economizes
on taxes has indeed provided society with a benefit. If, for example, there is an absolute level
(nominal rate) beyond which tax rates cannot be raised, and if tax rates are at that level
(which would not currently appear to be the case in the United States), then finding a way to
pay Jess taxes may be socially beneficial since the reduced availability of public sector funds
should· result in more efficient public sector expenditures and, in any event, in less rent
seeking activity.
18. Roger H. Gordon & Burton G. Malkiel, Corporate Finance, in How TAXES EFFECT
B EHAVIOR 131 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph Pechman eds., 1981);
William D. Andrews, Tax Neutrality Between Equity and Capital Debt, 30 WAYNE L. REV.
1057, 1058-64 (1984).
ECONOMIC

19. Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction Dis
courages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1491 (1993); Schlunk, NQPS,
supra note 14, at 67.

20. It should be fairly straightforward to place an upper bound on this amount. Since tax
professionals presumably are economic actors pursuing their highest and best use, their ag
gregate income should provide a bound. But when the income of the tax bar, the tax portion
of the accounting profession, the various investment bankers who indirectly practice tax by
cooking up various shelter schemes, and the various persons employed in corporate tax de
partments is aggregated, the result is surely not trivial.
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suits often requires threading a needle through a loophole of uncertain
size. This invariably leads to more reporting complexity, more gov
ernment audit expenditures, and more litigation than would a more
straightforward structure. This in turn leads to more uncertainty, and
ultimately less horizontal equity between taxpayers, with irrelevant
factors like the quality of reviewing IRS agents, the negotiating tactics
employed at appeals, and the luck with a given trier of fact affecting
ultimate tax burdens and, again, determining the winners and losers in
the economic game. There is much to be said for a simple unavoidable
1
tax that simply hits you over the head.2
Finally, there are costs related to the inability ideally to accommo
date interest-holder preferences. There are at least two aspects to
these costs. First, taxpayers will craft capital structures to optimize the
combination of their tax and nontax objectives. In general, this means
that a capital structure that is ideal purely from an economic perspec
tive can and will be jettisoned for sufficiently compelling tax consid
erations. If so, suppliers and users of capital will suffer a loss of "con
sumer" and "producer" surplus.22 In a capital structure neutral world,
such losses would disappear. Since all capital would, in every relevant
sense, be taxed alike, no tax benefits could be secured by slightly or
even radically altering capital instruments. Taxpayers could structure
their instruments, free of worry as to tax classification, in whatever
way maximized their utility based on nontax considerations.
A second and subtler cost associated with the lack of capital struc
ture neutrality is the creation of tensions among holders of a single
class of a corporation's capital interests.2 3 For example, consider the
21. This Article by design focuses only on the effects of capital structure on corporate
tax collections. In certain capital structure neutral tax regimes, opportunities unrelated to
capital structure will remain to reduce the amount of corporate or even interest holder tax.
Were such a capital structure neutral tax regime adopted, it is certainly to be expected that
considerable resources would continue to be expended - wasted - in attempts to exploit
such opportunities.

22. Consider, for example, the recently created tax classification of nonqualified pre
ferred stock ("NQPS"). I.RC. §§ 351(g) and 354(a)(2)(C) generally impose gain recognition
on exchanges in which NQPS is received. As a result, NQPS will never be received. Rather,
persons who would have liked to receive an instrument that would happen to be categorized
as NQPS will accept instead a slightly altered instrument that defers their gain recognition.
Schlunk, NQPS, supra note 14. But these altered instruments will by definition be less ideal
than those they replace. Perhaps they will require their holder to retain somewhat more eco
nomic risk than such holder desired. Or perhaps the holder will need to engage in additional
transactions - themselves costly - to hedge certain retained risk to the maximum extent
achievable under the Code. Or perhaps the holder will need to engage in additional transac
tions - partial sales of the position - at times other than those most desired, in order to
finance planned consumption. In any event, the transaction parties will suffer, but without
any increment of benefit to the Fisc.
23. That tensions exist, even absent taxes, between various classes of interest holders is
clear. Bondholders tend to like conservative business decisions; equity holders prefer man
agement to roll the dice (precisely because they have bondholders to absorb a share of the
potential losses). In a world with efficient markets and without the possibility of opportunis-

November 2000]

Capital Structure Neutrality

419

realization requirement for capital gains. When coupled with multiple
interest-holder tax rates, this requirement can produce divisions
among equity holders as to how to accomplish the generally agreed
upon goal of maximizing equity-holder wealth. Tax-exempt and other
low tax rate equity holders will generally support any above-market
taxable acquisition of their corporation; higher tax rate equity holders
may not. Thus the most fundamental corporate decision - whether to
sell the corporation - can become contested. Similarly, consider the
cash method taxation of dividends. Tax-exempt and other low tax rate
equity holders will generally be roughly indifferent as to a corpora
tion's dividend policy; higher tax rate equity holders will not be.
Again, an important corporate decision - earnings retention policy can become contested. In both these cases, the tax culprit that causes
the inconsistent preferences - the realization requirement for capital
gains in the first case, the cash method for taxing dividends in the sec
ond - cannot be reconciled into a capital structure neutral tax regime.
And indeed, no capital structure neutral tax regime would create these
particular tensions.
I also promised to make a third point - a political point - about
capital structure neutrality. Unlike certain Code provisions, which
clearly manifest congressional intent to benefit some taxpayer or an
other, most of the opportunities and/or traps created by the Code with
respect to corporate capital structure do not appear to reflect any co
herent congressional intent. Consider, most importantly, the corporate
deduction for interest expense. Some businesses, with very steady cash
flows, have little difficulty issuing debt instruments. Other businesses,
with more volatile cash flows, have great difficulty issuing debt instru
ments. The former can reduce the aggregate amount of taxes levied on
their operations through the judicious use of debt financing; the latter
cannot. Yet there is no evidence that Congress intended the corporate
interest deduction to have this effect. 24
Or consider the corporate compensation deduction upon the exer
cise of a nonqualified stock option. Since the amount of this deduction
is determined at exercise, rather than at grant, it rewards most those
corporations which have seen their equity perform particularly well.
These corporations will also - all things being equal - be generating
more income (relative to expectations) than will their poorly per
forming brethren. Thus, precisely those corporations with income to
tic "mid-stream" policy changes, these tensions will be fully reflected in the price of the cor
poration's capital instruments, and so should be of little moment.
Taxes can affect inter-class relations in positive or negative ways. One might think that
capital structures that expropriate from the Fisc would be liked by all - for the pie to be
split by owners, be they debtholders or equity holders, increases. But it need not be so. De
ductible dividends (if there were such) would expropriate from the Fisc, but since they would
also diminish the bondholders' equity cushion, might fail to win the bondholders' blessing.
24. See infra Part VII.
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shelter will be able to shelter it. Yet there is no evidence that Congress
intended the corporate compensation deduction on the exercise of
nonqualified stock options to be an additional reward to the already
successful.
Finally, but much more broadly, there is no evidence that Congress
intends to give corporations great latitude to use capital structure to
determine how much tax, directly or indirectly, they want to �ay. In
deed, a raft of Code complexity suggests precisely the opposite. 5
PART Ill - A SOLUTION: INTEGRATION, BUT ONLY SOMETIMES

It is easy to imagine capital structure neutral tax regimes. For ex
ample, imposing a tax only on corporate income, without any allow
ances based on capital structure, trivially results in a capital structure
neutral regime. 26 Similarly, imposing a tax only on interest holders, but
on a mark-to-market21 basis, may result in a capital structure neutral
tax regime. Since the only tax levied by such a regime would be meas
ured by something - fair market value - that would in the aggregate
be independent of capital structure, there would be no obvious way for
taxpayers to game the Fisc.28
Both of the foregoing are classically integrated tax regimes. For
purposes of this Article, a scheme of corporate and interest-holder
taxation is "integrated" if it levies only a single level of tax on some
coherently defined measure of income. The measure of income can be
some variant of economic income, as in the mark-to-market example,
or can be a purely tax-defined notion of income, such as federal tax
able income. The important point is that, however taxable income is
defined, no part of such income is taxed more than once.
As shall become clear in Part IV below, not all capital structure
neutral tax regimes are integrated. Conversely, not all integrated tax
regimes are capital structure neutral. Thus, an attempt to integrate our
current corporate tax regime by allowing a corporate-level deduction
for dividends paid - analogous to the interest expense deduction -

25. For example, with respect to corporate interest deductibility, see the limitations
found in I.RC. §§ 163(e)(5), 163(j), 163(1), 279, 385.

26. Indeed, certain allowances for capital, as opposed to capital structure, could proba
bly be tolerated. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Debt (and Debt
Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943, 957 (1989); Michael S. Knoll,
Designing A Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1850 (1994).

27. Mark-to-market taxation taxes interest holders annually on the change in value of
the interests they hold. No "realization" is required.

28. See, e.g., Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the
Cost of Capital, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433-43 (1963); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller,
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV.
261-97 (1958).
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would generally not be capital structure neutral. 29 Among the impedi
ments to capital structure neutrality that would remain are (1) the cash
method (for example, as applied to dividends) and (2) the lingering ef
fect of multiperiod basis recovery (for example, as applied to stock
and other financial instruments).

The Cash Method (a.k.a. Realization)
The cash method - which is the logical endpoint of the realization
requirement - has considerable lay appeal as a touchstone for taxa
tion. The amount of cash received is generally easy to measure; the
availability of a medium with which to pay any tax imposed is not in
doubt. However, the actual receipt of cash corresponds poorly to a
taxpayer's economic income. This leaves taxpayers subject to the cash
method with tremendous latitude as to when and how much to pay the
Fisc.
The most basic problem with a necessarily cash method dividends
paid deduction30 is that taxpayers can elect accrual instead by arrang
ing to have their stock pay out gains in cash on a current basis. For ex
ample, suppose in a two-period world that corporation X has equity
capital of $1000 that it invests in T-Bills yielding 10%. Suppose X's tax
rate is 33.33% . Suppose all of X's equity will be owned by a single tax
payer, either A or B. A has a tax rate of 66.67%; B has a tax rate of
0%. (A bit later, I will allow X's equity to be owned partially by A and
partially by B.) Finally, suppose that A or B, as the case may be, has
no investment opportunities other than X's equity, so that any
amounts paid out by X after the first period will be reinvested - after
paying taxes of course - in X.
Figure 1 shows a representative sample of four different tax results
achievable in a cash method deductible dividends regime. The first
pair of results assumes that X pays no first-period dividend on its eq
uity. 31 Thus, both X's deduction and its interest holder's income are
29. In contrast, a regime that allowed a dividend exclusion for equity holders has a
fighting chance of being made capital structure neutral. The key would be to recharacterize a
portion of any capital gain as an excludable dividend to the extent of retained earnings. If
that were done, the only lingering problem would be a disadvantage to debt to the extent
that interest is accrued or paid by corporations having insufficient corporate taxable income.
That, in tum, could be cured by making debtholder interest accruals tax exempt to the extent
of any shortfall in corporate income.
Equivalently, Michael Knoll has suggested that taxing debtholders on periodic interest
(that is, putting them on the cash method) and taxing equity holders on retained earnings,
but with a basis adjustment, also results in a capital structure neutral integrated tax regime.
See Knoll, supra note 19, at 1508-09. Again, provided one cures the disadvantage to debt un
der circumstances of insufficient corporate taxable income, this seems correct.
30. Unlike interest, which generally accrues as a legal matter, dividends or rights to divi
dends only arise if and when declared by the corporation.

31. Note that under § 305(c) the instrument described in the text is technically common
stock, and so is outside of the current preferred stock OID rules. Indeed, the same interest
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taxed when X redeems the instrument at the end of the second period.
Under these facts, A would be left with $68.88 of two-year after-tax
income, and B would be left with $206.67 of two-year after-tax income.

1. Earnings Retained
First Period

X's Income
X's Div'd Exp/A's Div'd Inc
X's Net Income

X's Tax
X's Retained Earnings

A/B's Income

A/B's Tax

A/B's Reinvested Earnings
Second Period

X's Income
X's Div'd Exp/A's Div'd Inc
X's Net Income

X's Tax
X's Retained Earnings
A/B's Income

A/B's Tax
A/B's After-Tax Income

A/B's Two-Period After-Tax Income

FIGURE

x

100.00

1
A

100.00

3.33
�

100.00

B

100.00

ki:6;3)

106.67
t206.67�
100.00

x

a:6;3)

206.67
20o.O/

206.67
-

Uli1s1s)

2lJo.6r

68.88

206.67

holder tax treatment would follow under current law even for cumulative preferred stock, so
long as such stock were issued with an unstated but clearly understood policy that X will nei
ther currently declare nor currently pay the accumulating dividends.

November 2000]
2. Partial Dividend
First Period

X's Income
X's Div'd Exp/A's Div'd Inc
X's Net Income

X's Tax
X's Retained Earnings
A/B's Income

x

A

�
�

50.00

100.00
50.00)
0.00
16.67)
3.34

A/B's Tax
A/B's Reinvested Earnings
Second Period

X's Income
X's Div'd Exp/A's Div'd Inc
X's Net Income

X's Tax
X's Retained Earnings
A/B's Income

A/B's Tax
A/B's After-Tax Income

3. Full Dividend
First Period

X's Income
X's Div'd Exp/A's Div'd Inc
X's Net Income

X's Tax
X's Retained Earnings

105.00
55.00)
50.00)
6.67
(33.34)

r

x

100.00
(100.00)

X's Net Income

X's Tax
X's Retained Earnings

3.34

155.00

T55:00

ki�u34)

A

100.00

108.33
58.33)
e50.00)
6.67
(33.34)

103.33

x

100.00
(100.00)

X's Income
X's Div'd Exp/A's Div'd Inc
X's Net Income

X's Tax
X's Retained Earnin s

100.00
(100.00)

.i\

110.00
(1 10.00)

A/B's Tax
A/B's Reinvested Earnings

X's Income
X's Div'd Exp/A's Div'd Inc
X's Net Income

X's Tax
X's Retained Eamin s

.i\

A/B's Income (inclu es gain of$20)

A/B's Tax
A/B's After-Tax Income

A/B's Two-Period After-Tax Income

100.00

104.67
m.ot

&�:s%2)
68.22

100.00

110.00

-

lilf.00""
210.00

x

100.00
(100.00)

B

100.00
im:uo

�:6l4)
104.67
(104.67)

B

TfO]j(J

su:oo-

A/B's Income (inclu es loss of$20)

Second Period

A

I58":"3T
-

-

67.77

x

158.33

llJlf.DO

A/B sells X's equity at end of period 1 for $980 (i.e., a loss of $20)

First Period

-

"TOOJj{)

��N)

A/B's Two-Period After-Tax Income

5u:ou

208.33

10TIT

A/B's Income

A/B's Tax
A/B's After-Tax Income

50.00

I58:n-

!JJ��7)

103.33
(103.33)

B

�

"TOOJj{)

A/B's Tax
A/B's Reinvested Earnings
Second Period

100.00

�50.00)
0.00
�16.67)

68.33

A/B's Income

X's Income
X's Div'd Exp/A's Div'd Inc

�

x

�i:6;4)

A/B's Two-Period After-Tax Income

4.
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The second pair of results assumes that X pays out as a first period
dividend only a portion - here 50%
of its first period earnings.
Under such a pay-out strategy, A is worse off than he is when X re
tains all of its earnings because his tax rate is higher than X's tax rate.
Thus, X's dividends-paid deduction saves X less tax than the corre
sponding dividend inclusion costs A.32 However, the very same pay-out
strategy benefits B. The reason is that B's tax rate is lower than X's.
Thus, X's dividends paid deduction saves X more tax than the corre
sponding dividend inclusion costs B.
The third pair of results assumes that X pays out all of its first pe
riod earnings on a current basis. This leads to the same ordering of
after-tax results as the partial pay-out strategy immediately above, and
for exactly the same reasons. The results are worth noting separately,
however, because they correspond to the most likely form of accrual .
accounting which could be applied. Thus, for example, if X's equity in
strument were a mandatorily redeemable preferred stock subject to
Code Section 305( c ), and if dividends were deductible by X under the
same accrual regime, the after-tax results would be those illustrated
here, whether or not a first-period dividend was paid. More impor
tantly, since this example corresponds to the tax results under accrual
accounting, it demonstrates that taxpayers can achieve accrual ac
counting results with a cash method instrument simply by adjusting
X's dividend policy.
Finally, the fourth pair of results assumes both that X currently
pays out all first period earnings (or, equivalently, that X's instrument
is subject to the accrual method) and that X's interest holder disposes
of the instrument (and buys back an equivalent instrument) at the end
-

32. When interest-holder tax rates exceed the corporate tax rate, the ideal strategy in an
integrated world is maximum earnings retention on the part of the corporation. The benefit
achievable is analogous to that provided by a tax-deferred savings plan such as an IRA or a
401(K) plan. Here, as there, there is a deferred increment of tax - the excess of the interest
holder rate on the inclusion of the dividend over the corporate savings on the deduction of
the dividend - that is reinvested at a reduced tax rate (corporate rather than interest
holder) for a period of time.
One can view the deferred increment of tax as a "borrowing" of what is essentially the
Fisc's money, but without any need ever to pay any interest on such borrowing. A.n interest
charge can theoretically compensate for the interest-free borrowing from the Fisc. But it is
far from clear which interest rate should be used. The Fisc will be whole so long as it is paid
the rate at which it borrows (since it can cover any revenue shortfall by borrowing at such
rate). But that will leave the borrower with a far better interest rate than the borrower would
generally be able to achieve on his own. Using the borrower's borrowing rate should make
the borrower indifferent, but determining such rate poses some practical difficulties. Finally,
one could use whatever rate is implied by the borrower's actual investment results, providing
the fungibility of money is suitably accounted for. While this approach might appear unde
sirably to link the Fisc's fortunes with those of the borrower, it is hard to argue that they are
not already inextricably intertwined by the tax system as a whole.
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of the first period at a $20 loss. 33 In addition to the dividend income, A
or B thus recognizes a $20 first-period loss ( and a corresponding $20
second-period gain) . 34 Under these assumptions, a fourth set of after
tax results - indeed those corresponding to a mark-to-market interest
holder tax regime - is achieved.
Since identical economic fact patterns lead to different tax results,
the proffered tax regime - integration by means of a dividends-paid
deduction - is not capital structure neutral. 3 5 But could it easily be
made so? Ignoring the additional complexities posed by dispositions
( as in the fourth scenario above) , one might think the answer is yes,
provided only corporate and interest-holder tax rates were uniformly
the same. For in that case, corporations could not increase the after
tax yield of their interest holders through opportunistic distribution
decisions. Whatever tax collections the Fisc loses by virtue of a corpo
rate distribution, it exactly recovers by virtue of an interest-holder in
come inclusion. Or phrased differently, whatever tax collections the
Fisc gains by virtue of a corporate decision to retain earnings are ex
actly offset by the tax collections foregone with respect to the withheld
dividend. So at all times, the capital available for interest holder in
vestment is fixed; there is no way to "borrow" or "lend" incremental
amounts from or to the Fisc.

33.

Since I still assume that X earns 10% on all of its invested capital, the explanation
for the price decline is unlikely to be a global increase in interest rates. Rather, it is likely
related either to X's credit quality or the liquidity of X's equity.

34.

In this example, X's interest holder is treated as not being subject to any loss limita
tion rules, such as the wash-sale rules of § 1091 or the limit on the deductibility of capital
losses of § 1211(b). The justification for this treatment is that in practice, such rules are gen
erally easily avoidable, particularly in the context of an interest holder with a portfolio of
investments. Such a holder can reacquire economically identical instruments, which are not,
however, "substantially identical" within the meaning of § 1091. And he will typically have
gains from the sales of other instruments which can absorb any selectively realized capital
losses.

35. One could object to the analysis in the text on the basis of economic compulsion. If
the corporate tax rate were lower than the average interest-holder tax rate, so that retention
of earnings were a good thing, one would expect corporations to be capitalized with nothing
but equity, and that equity would never pay dividends. Thus, in a sense, there would not be
any choice as to capital structure. Conversely, if the corporate tax rate were higher than the
average interest-holder tax rate, so that retention of earnings were a bad thing, one would
expect corporations to be capitalized either with zero-coupon debt instruments or with
current-pay debt or equity instruments. The choice would depend on whether there were an
effective method of compelling reinvestment of distributed funds. But, again, the interest
and/or dividend deduction would accrue currently, and so there would be no real choice as to
capital structure.
A simple response to this is that a system is not capital structure neutral if it offers a
smorgasbord of tax results, even if some are only chosen by the misinformed. Even the cur
rent tax system compels taxpayers to act in certain ways so as to minimize tax, and arguably
any failure on the part of taxpayers to act in exactly such ways is in effect a voluntary pay
ment to the Fisc by the misinformed. But whether one views the Code as presenting oppor
tunities, traps or both, the fact remains that under both the cash method system discussed in
the text and the horribly complicated system confronted in the real world, there is a need to
be informed. Under a capital structure neutral tax regime, this need vanishes.
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In the examples, assuming that A and B each own an identical
share of X, corporate and average interest holder tax rates would be
the same.36 Since our tax system is - even post-1986 - staunchly pro
gressive with different tax rates imposed on different interest holders,
as well as with a cadre of interest holders who are blessed with tax
exempt status, this is the best one can presently hope for. But is it
enough?
No, unless there is a way of forcing every interest holder to hold
the average portfolio. Put differently, a progressive rate structure
permits the targeting of capital instruments to taxpayers with specific
tax characteristics (tax clienteles). Thus, sticking with the example
above, suppose A and B each provide X with exactly half of its capital
(thus guaranteeing that X's average interest holder has a tax rate of
33.33 %, since the average of A's 66.67% tax rate and B's 0% tax rate
is 33.33 %). What would X do? It would issue two classes of equity in
struments, one of which would be current-pay and one of which would
not. A and B would then perfectly segregate themselves: A would pur
chase only noncurrent-pay instruments and B would purchase only
current-pay instruments. Thus, contrary to hope and intent, the Fisc
would not extract exactly the same amount of tax from a dividend in
clusion as it loses from a dividend deduction. Moreover, so long as tax
exempt interest holders such as B were allowed to retain their tax ex
emption, there is no tax rate that could be imposed on the taxable in
terest holders that would effectively offset the tax savings from the
corporate dividend deduction. That dooms any integration scheme
based on a cash method dividends paid deduction.

Accrual Methods
An interesting question is whether the accrual method can save the
day. The most honest answer is that it depends on what is being ac
crued. Thus, suppose accrual is based on expected returns, but with a
true-up mechanism to conform the expected returns which have been
taxed to the actual returns realized by an interest holder upon the oc
currence of certain events (for example, the distribution of cash in ex
cess of accruals and/or the disposition of the instrument). 37 Suppose
further that expectations are rational, so that both the Fisc and all tax
payers know the expected returns that any financial instrument will
generate.
Consider an equity instrument issued by X and having an expected
return of 10%. If A, whose 66.67% tax rate exceeds X's 33.33% tax
36. The average of A's 66.67% tax rate and B's 0% tax rate is 33.33%, which is X's tax
rate.
37. Cf Treas. Reg. § l.1275-4(b)(6) (1999) (providing rules for the treatment of positive
and negative adjustments under the noncontingent bond method).
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rate, holds such instrument, the following optimal strategy will obtain:
Suppose the actual return from the instrument, in a given period, ex
ceeds 10%. X should nonetheless pay out no more than 10%. By hy
pothesis, for any pay out up to 10%, the pay out does not affect the tax
accrual of 10%. A higher pay out, however, both increases X's deduc
tion and increases A's dividend inclusion. Since A's tax rate exceeds
X's, this is in effect a negative arbitrage. Phrased differently, a deferral
opportunity will have been lost. Now suppose that the actual return
from the instrument, in a given period, is only 5%. In that case, X
should redeem the instrument. Such redemption will trigger a true-up
for A, thus insuring that A is taxed only on the actual 5% return rather
than on the hypothesized 10% return. X's deduction may or may not
be adjusted likewise (that will depend on whether cancellation of in
debtedness income ("CODI")-like tax rules were instituted to replace
Code Section 1032), but even if so, the lost deduction would cost X
less in tax savings than the reduced income inclusion would save A.
Now suppose B, with his 0% tax rate, holds X's equity instrument.
If the actual return from the instrument exceeds the tax accrual of
10%, X should pay out the entire actual return. For, in that case, X's
deduction for dividends paid saves more tax than B's corresponding
dividend inclusion costs. If, however, the actual return from the in
strument is less than 10%, X and B should simply do nothing; X's
benefit from the phantom excess deduction exceeds B's detriment
from the phantom excess income inclusion.
And, of course, if both A and B want to hold X's equity instru
ments, X should create two classes of an otherwise identical instru
ment, with one class predictably serving the best tax interests of A and
the other predictably serving the best tax interests of B. A and B will
segregate their ownership in the most advantageous way. And the
Fisc, for all its accuracy in accruing expected returns, will nonetheless
be fleeced by taxpayers. Why? Because the true-up effectively places
taxpayers on the cash method with respect to any difference between
actual returns and expected returns. Thus, all the opportunities and
pitfalls of the pure cash method system for equity remain, but are sim
ply calculated with respect to a new baseline expected return: the im
plicit 0% expected return accrual of the pure cash method system has
been replaced with an economically correct expected return accrual.
What must be done to achieve capital structure neutrality? One
must abolish the ability to do postissuance tax planning. There are es
sentially three ways to accomplish this. At one extreme, one could ig
nore all true-ups. Taxpayers would be taxed on what they were ex
pected to earn, rather than on what they actually earned.38 This

38. Of course, Congress would be bombarded by pleas from underperformers and by
requests for the blood of overperformers.
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effectively turns the income tax into a wealth tax, and is further dis
cussed in Part IV below.
Second, at the other extreme, one could require an annual true-up
(assuming an annual measurement of income and an annual collection
of tax). Thus, each period would end with an accurate measurement of
economic income, and there would be neither unrealized income to
defer nor unrealized losses to accelerate. This tax system is, of course,
commonly referred to as mark-to-market, and is also discussed further
in Part IV below.
Third, one can try a completely different tack, by accruing equity
holder taxable income neither on the basis of an expected market rate
of income (as in a wealth tax) nor on the basis of actual investment
performance (as in a mark-to-market tax), but rather on the basis of
corporate taxable income. That is, rather than imposing any tax at the
corporate level, and thus making relevant differences between equity
holder and corporate tax rates, one could allocate corporate income
among corporate interest holders (with suitable basis adjustments).
Current tax rules for the taxation of debt already have the feature of
moving a portion of a corporation's taxable income into the hands of
debtholders. If the remainder were transported into the hands of eq
uity holders, capital structure neutrality could result. 39

Multi-Period Basis Recovery
Another feature of current tax law that conflicts with capital struc
ture neutrality is the host of different methods of multi-period basis
recovery. As these would not necessarily be eliminated by all forms of
corporate integration, it follows again that not all integrated tax re
gimes are capital structure neutral. In particular, simply adding a cor
porate dividends-paid deduction would not necessarily limit taxpayer
choices with respect to basis recovery.
A short list of taxpayer basis recovery choices (not limited to cor
porate capital instruments) follows. Subchapter K, Subchapter S and
"open transaction" treatment - which is still allowed for liquidating
distributions from C corporations and in certain other unusual circum
stances40 - all allow basis recovery to precede income recognition. On
the other hand, debt and equity instruments acquired for cash - the
heart of Subchapter C - generally feature only basis recovery upon
the disposition of the instrument. Along with these basis recovery first
and last regimes, the Code contains some ratable recovery schemes as
well. Thus, if a debt instrument is received in exchange for property,
basis recovery is ratable to the expected "total contract price" set forth
39. See Knoll, Taxing Prometheus, supra note 19, at 1508-09.

40. See generally Rev. Ru!. 68-348, 1968-2 C.B. 141; Rev. Rul. 85-48; 1985-1 CB 126; see
also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(2)(iii).
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in the debt instrument, assuming the instrument otherwise provides
for adequate interest.4 1 But if the debt instrument is a contingent pay
ment debt instrument, then depending on the nature of the contin
gency, basis may be recovered in proportion to the maximum potential
payments, if such maximum is determinable, or equally over a set
number of years, if the number of years over which payments may be
received is determinable, or in fifteen equal annual installments, if nei
ther the maximum selling price nor a maximum period for payments
can be established.42 Then there are the contingent payment OID
regulations, which contain the so-called "noncontingent bond
method," pursuant to which a projected payment schedule with a pre
determined yield is established, and basis is recovered in proportion to
the principal payments under such schedule.4 3 Finally, Code Section
125 6 dispenses with all such nonsense for futures contracts and similar
financial instruments, providing instead for full annual basis recovery
(a.k.a. mark-to-market).
That the type of basis recovery scheme affects the desirability of a
given capital instrument should be obvious from the history of the
open transaction method, as well as from such recent abuses of the in
stallment sales basis recovery rules as those found in A CM Partnership
v. Commissioner.44 But a brief example will nonetheless help make the
point. Suppose A acquires for $100 X's instrument which promises a
cash flow of $10 at the end of the first period and $110 at the end of
the second. A can and will reinvest his first period's after-tax cash re
ceipt at the same implied 10% pre-tax rate. Assume A's tax rate is
40%.
The first part of Figure 2 illustrates some of A's possible after-tax
results, depending on the basis recovery rule employed. Not surpris
ingly, A is better off the sooner he can recover his basis. Of course,
current federal income tax law would not allow A the totally unfet
tered choice of basis recovery scheme. However, there are situations
in which taxpayers can strategically choose from side-by-side basis re
covery schemes. Moreover, such choice will continue to plague tax
collections as long as there is no effective integration for tax purposes
of all instruments held by a single taxpayer.
The second part of Figure 2 shows how the self-help of breaking a
single instrument into two instruments affects A's tax results. Suppose
the first instrument promises a cash payment of $10 at the end of the
first period, and the second promises a cash payment of $110 at the
end of the second. So long as the term structure of interest rates is flat
41. l.R.C. § 453.

42. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c).
43. Treas. Reg. § l .1275-4(b).

44.

157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
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and there is a proper accrual for tax purposes of the yield on the sec
ond instrument, A gains nothing from his ploy. But neither of these
conditions is likely to hold in practice. Thus, the second part of Figure
2 shows how a term structure that is not flat can and should affect tax
collections. It also shows how the lack of proper accrual affects tax
collections.45
FIGURE 2: PART 1
BASIS RECOVERY SCHEMES - SINGLE INSTRUMENT
Basis
Recovered
First

Basis
Recovered Upon
Disposition

Basis
Recovered Ratably
to Cash

Basis
Recovered Equally
Each Period

First Period
Invested Amount

$ 100.00

$ 100.00

$ 100.00

$ 100.00

Total Basis

$ 100.00

$ 100.00

$ 100.00

$ 100.00

Cash Received

$ 10.00

$ 10.00

$ 10.00

$ 10.00

Basis Recovered

$ 10.00

$

$

8.33

$ 50.00

Taxable Income

$

$ 10.00

$

1.67

Tax Paid

$

$ (4.00)

$ (0.67)

$ 16.00

After-Tax Cash

$ 10.00

$

9.33

$ 26.00

Adjusted Basis

$ 90.00

$ 100.00

$ 91.67

$ 50.00

6.00

$

$ (40.00)

Second Period
Invested Amount

$ 110.00

$ 106.00

$ 109.33

$ 126.00

Total Basis

$ 100.00

$ 106.00

$ 101.00

$ 76.00

Cash Received

$ 121.00

$ 116.60

$ 120.27

$ 138.60

Basis Recovered

$ 100.00

$ 106.00

$ 101.00

$ 76.00

Taxable Income
Tax Paid

$ 21.00
$ (8.40)

$ 10.60
$ (4.24)

$ 19.27
$ (7.71)

$ 62.60
$ (25.04)

After-Tax Cash

$ 112.60

$ 112.36

$ 112.56

$ 113.56

The foregoing effects may be magnified when the corporate tax even a corporate tax integrated with a dividends paid deduction - is
taken into account. The reason is that a debt instrument's pre
commitment to a certain stream of cash flows restricts the ability of the
parties to alter basis recovery schemes. Thus, suppose now that X cor

poration pays tax at a 33.33% rate. It predictably earns $10 before
taxes. Its interest holder, A, who pays tax at a 66.67% rate on all in
come (including capital gains, so that the capital gains preference
makes no difference) wants to maximize the after-tax return from X's
distribution of X's after-tax income. Suppose A's initial basis in its X
instrument is $100, and that the value of that instrument climbs dollar-

45. This could occur, for example, if the instruments in question were equity instruments
and if the "promised" cash flows were not sufficiently promised to invoke the preferred
stock OID rules. What the bifurcation amounts to is a successful dividend strip.
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for-dollar from $100 by the amount of X's after-tax earnings. If A re
ceives a payment from X either as interest on a debt instrument or as a
dividend on stock, the amount received is $10 (since I am assuming
dividends are deductible ) . A pays $6.67 of tax and retains $3.33.
FIGURE 2: PART 2
BASIS RECOVERY SCHEMES
Term Structure Not Flat•
YTM Taxation

First Period

-

Two INSTRUMENTS
Successful
Dividend Strip

Term Structure Not Flat•
Proper Taxation
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$
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$ 98.00

$
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$ 100.00
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$
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$ 98.00

$
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$ 90.91
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$ 0.74
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$

0.96
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$ (4.80)

$ (0.39)
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$ (7.64)
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$ 105.96

$
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$ 1 0.21

$ J02.36

6.48

1 12.44

7.30

1 12.50

1 12.58

• First period interest rate is assumed to be 8%; second period interest rate is therefore 12.24%.
•• This assumes that taxes with respect to the two-period instrument are paid from the proceeds of the
one-period instrument.

If A holds stock, but not if A holds debt, A can change this result.
In that case, X could pay no dividend, but could instead use its after
tax income to repurchase a bit of A's stock. In such case, X would
have after-tax cash of $6.67 ($10 of income less $3.33 of corporate tax )
and would redeem 6.25 % of A's stock ($6.67 out of $106.67). A would
be entitled to a basis offset of $6.25 (6.25% of A's total basis of $100).
Thus, A would pay tax of 66.67% only on a gain of $0.42 ($6.67 minus
$6.25), for a tax payment of $0.28. When the dust settles, A is left with
$6.39 ($6.67 sales proceeds less $0.28 of taxes) , which is considerably

432

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:410

more than in the case of receipt of an explicit dividend. Tax rules thus
favor equity. And the net effect is that capital structure is not neutral.46
Thus, economically identical corporate capital instruments can
yield disparate tax results solely due to the possible availability of dif
ferent schemes of multi-period basis recovery. To achieve capital
structure neutrality, such differences cannot be tolerated. There are
two basic solutions. First, one could dispense with basis recovery alto
gether - that is, basis is never recovered - as one would do, for ex
ample, under a wealth tax.47 Part IV below discusses such schemes. Al
ternatively, one could recover basis, in its entirety, every period. This
is essentially what a mark-to-market income measure accomplishes.
This, too, is discussed in Part IV below.
PART IV - A SOLUTION: DECOUPLE THE TAXES
The lesson of the prior Part is that integration does not guarantee
capital structure neutrality. The converse is true as well: capital struc
ture neutrality does not require integration. For example, consider a
tax regime in which a corporate tax is imposed on some definition of
corporate income, but without any deductions (or other adjustments)
in respect of items determined or affected by a corporation's capital
structure. Thus, corporate tax collections can neither be decreased nor
increased by virtue of capital structure. Under such a regime, a CFO
will be unable to generate wealth for the corporation's interest holders
at the expense of the Fisc, unless such CFO structures the corpora
tion's capital interests so that such interests, in and of themselves, gen
erate tax opportunities for their holders.
Current law taxes corporate interests in ways that create precisely
such opportunities. Most equity instruments (and even some debt
instruments) provide their holders with elective deferral. In addition,
most equity instruments allow their holders to characterize economic
gains as capital gains, which are subject to reduced tax rates. Finally,
all instruments - by virtue of the realization requirement - allow
holders strategically to dispose of them to accelerate losses (subject, of
course, to certain ineffectual limitations such as the wash sale rules
and the annual limitation on net losses).
I do not know of any easily comprehensible intuitive way to char
acterize all possible interest-holder tax regimes that do not create any
such tax opportunities. Professors Auerbach, Bradford, and Strnad

46. The differences between the Code § 1032 regime for reacquired equity and the Code
§ 108 and Treas. Reg. § 1.163-7(c) regime for reacquired debt will magnify the benefits of
equity in cases of falling value.
47. The retroactive capital gains taxation scheme set forth in Auerbach, supra note 5, is
another example of a scheme with no basis recovery.
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48
have each developed formulations for such regimes. Applying such
formulation to create actual usable tax rules, however, is another mat
ter entirely. I will not attempt a universal formulation. Rather, I will
give a series of more-or-less easily comprehensible solutions. They in
clude excise taxes, wealth taxes, consumption taxes and accretion
taxes. Which, if any, of such taxes can linguistically, economically, con
stitutionally or otherwise be fairly termed income tax is a question for
another day.
A.

Excise Taxes

By excise tax I mean any tax imposed on an interest holder merely
by virtue of his status as such, but not necessarily measured by any
economic feature of his capital holdings. Thus, for example, a tax re
gime could extract a uniform tax
$1 - from any holder of any capi
tal instrument. If such tax were imposed simply on the privilege of
ownership, and did not multiply when a holder held more than one
capital instrument, there would be nothing either a CFO or an indi
vidual who wished to invest in capital instruments could do to diminish
the tax.
-

Less trivially, one could impose an excise tax on an interest
holder's invested capital. Such a tax, which has a whiff of franchise tax
about it, could be based on any of a myriad of different measures of
capital, ranging from the amount of invested capital such interest rep
resented at the time it was issued (that is, how many dollars actually
went into the corporate coffers), to the amount of invested capital plus
retained entity-level earnings such interest represents currently (based
on some capital structure neutral allocation scheme of such earnings),
to the fair market value of such interest (this last being also what I call
49
a wealth tax, and hence being dealt with in Section B below). So long
as all types of capital are treated equally - for example, so long as
debt-financing is made equally subject to such tax - there will be no
ability on the part of corporations or their interest holders to tinker
50
with the amount of such tax.

48. See Auerbach, supra note 5; David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting:
Symmetry, Consistency, and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L.
REV. 731 (1995); Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46
STAN. L. REV. 569 (1994).
49. Some superficially similar measures, such as the amount the holder actually paid for
the interest in the secondary market, will not accomplish the goal. For example, such a basis
type measure would introduce realization-type rules into the system. Thus, a taxpayer will
have an incentive never to exchange an instrument he acquired at a low cost; he will be
"locked in." (This is a form of deferral!) Using the terminology previously developed, post
issuance taxpayer behavior would affect aggregate tax collections, in violation of the dictates
of capital structure neutrality.

50. At least one of the metrics arguably allows some tinkering: If the corporation pays
out a higher fraction of its earnings, there would appear to be a smaller tax base in the event
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Wealth Taxes

On the most simple level, and assuming away valuation problems,
an interest-holder tax based on wealth offers little prospect for
gamesmanship. Few CFOs and fewer interest holders will purposely
1
create capital structures that depress the value of their corporations.5

of an excise tax imposed on the sum of invested capital plus retained earnings. But such ap
pearance is deceptive. Provided interest holders did not change their consump
tion/investment patterns on the basis of dividend policy, and provided further that the excise
tax applied equally to investments in all manner of entities (including, for example, partner
ships), any incremental dividend pay outs would be reinvested in another entity, and so
would still attract the excise tax.

51.

Of course, one can not exclude such behavior entirely. For example, corporate capi
tal structures are sometimes designed to accomplish such noneconomic goals as preserving
family ownership, and in such cases might depress the aggregate value that the corporation's
capital interests would have under a more ideal capital structure. (Private ownership may, in
some cases, actually increase value. For example, a private company will escape certain
costly reporting requirements. In addition, the dearth of public information about a private
company may give it certain competitive advantages. Since such increases in value will pre
sumably be reflected in the company's earnings, they should easily be accounted for in valua
tion.)
Fundamentally, a depressed value for a private corporation's capital interests may result
from either of two causes. First, the management which is entrenched by the capital structure
may be woefully inefficient. Second, the capital structure itself may cause the corporation's
capital interests to be illiquid. A fair wealth tax would not make allowances for such depres
sions of value (i.e., it would be imposed on the higher value the corporation would have if it
had better management and/or more liquid interests).
Eradicating the collateral wealth tax benefits of inefficient management may seem
analogous to taxing individuals on the basis of their potential, rather than on their actual,
earnings (or equivalently, to taxing leisure). And it is. But unlike in the case of leisure, where
one quickly runs into issues sounding of human dignity, involuntary servitude, and the like,
in the case of corporations the question is more-or-less squarely one of optimal (non-human
capital) asset deployment. (Not entirely, of course, since the inefficient deployment of the
manager's human capital is involved, and perhaps too that of other nepotistically-hired em
ployees.) And whatever society may think about the pursuit of happiness, it need not and
should not think the same about the wasteful deployment of assets.
Moreover, a host of intangible benefits - power, prestige, satisfaction, whatever - gen
erally flow from dynastic ownership. Economically, these are additional items of "income"
accruing to the owners of the capital interests to which the benefits attach. If a corporation's
owners are rational, the "private" value represented by such benefits must at least compen
sate for the foregone "market" value resulting from inefficient asset management. Fairness
dictates that a wealth tax should not countenance any discount for a capital structure that
reduces "market" value for the sake of creating such "private" value.
Accounting for liquidity issues in a wealth tax may pose different concerns, but not in the
case of self-imposed restraints on alienation. Those, at least, are pure examples of temporar
ily destroying market value for the sake of creating private value. And indeed, most valua
tion methodologies can easily accommodate the inclusion of the intangible ownership bene
fits created by illiquid structures. In particular, any methodology that takes as a starting
point a measure of value, and then applies a discount - blockage, liquidity, lack of market
ability, or however else denominated - can be used. One simply does not apply the dis
count.
More problematic are cases where an illiquid interest is acquired at a discount to what
would have been its value if it were liquid. Generally, to compensate for illiquidity, the pur
chaser will require a higher expected rate of return than is available from liquid assets. Since
the wealth tax under discussion is intended to be a substitute for an income tax, and since the
expected return from an asset is arguably a better measure of income than is some preor
dained fraction of the asset's value, one can make a compelling argument for even ignoring
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What might a suitable periodic wealth tax look like? There seem to
me two general approaches. First, one could tax a fraction of an indi
52
vidual's net worth, determined at the beginning of the tax period.
This approach is equivalent to imputing an expected return at a fixed
rate on the individual's assets, and imposing a tax on such expected re
turn. That such a tax is capital structure neutral is relatively obvious.
The amount of tax paid by any interest holder is fixed before he makes
his investment decisions, and is independent of such decisions. Thus,
his investment decisions will reflect his tax-independent risk and re
ward preferences. Accordingly, whether his tax rate is high or low, his
investment decisions will not change. And nothing a CFO can do to
design instruments with different risk-reward profiles will successfully
steer any such instruments (e.g., high expected return instruments)
systematically into the hands of taxpayers of any one tax rate (e.g., a
low tax rate).
The second broad approach to a wealth tax - albeit one quite im
practical to implement - is to tax an individual on the expected return
53
from his specific mix of assets. This approach is to some extent hinted
54
at in the OID rules. And it is also, to some extent, the approach ad
55
vocated by certain scholars. It is not entirely clear, however, that this
approach is still capital structure neutral. Here's why.
Any corporation (in particular one in a world imposing a corpo
rate-level tax that is unaffected by capital structure) is economically a

the discount in this case. For example, suppose an asset would sell for $100 if liquid, and
would offer a 10% perpetual expected return. If it is illiquid, it might sell for $50. But the
nominal return would be the same, and so the asset now offers a 20% expected return. If a
wealth tax were based on a fixed percentage of an asset's value - for example, 1 % - the
person holding the liquid asset would pay twice as much tax as the one holding the illiquid
asset, even though their expected "incomes" would be the same.

52. A variant would be to base the tax on an individual's end-of-period net worth. Such
a tax is equivalent to a combination of a wealth tax imposed on beginning-of-period wealth
and a tax on the period's mark-to-market income. This latter type of tax is discussed in Sec
tion D below.
Note, in addition, that the periodicity of tax collections means that, under a steady state
assumption regarding tax rates, a wealth tax based on beginning-of-period wealth would
function (in all periods except the first and the last) exactly like a tax on end-of-period
wealth. This for the more-or-less obvious reason that the second period's beginning-of
period wealth tax collection is identical to the first period's end-of-period wealth tax collec
tion, and so on. Hence any wealth tax, including the one measured on the basis of beginning
of-period wealth discussed in the text, includes an implicit tax on mark-to-market gains. I
will not take account of this subtlety in the discussion of the potential investment effects oc
casioned by a "pure" wealth tax.
Finally, other metrics for a wealth tax - such as a period's average wealth, or its mini
mum or maximum wealth - are easily imagined. Taxes based on such metrics are more
complicated to analyze, and produce no discernable benefit. Accordingly, they will be ig
nored.
53. Such an approach would moot the question posed supra note 51, of whether liquidity
discounts should be taken into account in the wealth tax base.
54. See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4.

55. See, e.g., Shuldiner, supra note 5.
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set of random cash flows. Any state of the world - which will occur
with some probability - carries with it one such cash flow. By hy
pothesis and/or Modigliani & Miller, capital structure does not affect
such cash flow. The corporation's capital structure determines entitle
ments of interest holders to the cash flow, however. By definition, the
capital structure must exhaust the cash flow: every dollar belongs to
some interest holder; no dollar belongs to more than one interest
holder. It follows that the expected value of a corporation's aggregate
cash flows across all states of the world must equal the sum of the ex
pected values of the cash flows of the corporation's various capital in
56
terests. Moreover, the expected return from the corporation's aggre
gate asset mix must equal the weighted sum of the expected returns
57
from its various capital interests.
That being the case, a tax imposed at a uniform rate on the ex
pected returns of a corporation's capital instruments can not be ma
nipulated by varying capital structure. Create instruments with low
expected returns, and some high expected return stub instruments will
remain. Sum the products of the beginning-of-period values of the in
struments by their expected returns and the result will always be the
product of the corporation's beginning-of-period value and its ex
pected rate of return. And this equality will, of course, continue to
hold if each of the products is in turn multiplied by the prevailing uni
form tax rate. Thus, if interest holders are taxed at a uniform rate on
their expected returns, the amount of wealth tax to be collected from
the holders of capital interests of any given corporation is preordained.
It can not be manipulated.
But if a tax is imposed, as is ours, at a variety of tax rates, the
equality may break down. That is, a corporation can create a variety of
capital instruments with different (but mathematically related) risk
reward relationships. If high tax rate investors systematically gravitate
to the low expected return instruments, and low tax rate investors sys
tematically gravitate to the high expected return instruments, the Fisc
may yet be whipsawed.
For example, suppose X has $1000 of capital earning an after
corporate-tax expected return of 10% or $100. If A, with his 66.67%

56. This is because "expected value," which is just a type of integration, is a linear func

tion.

57.

Let V(O) be the value of the entity at the beginning of the given period. Assume two
financial interests, A and B, with initial values VA(O) and VB(O). Thus, V(O) VA(O) +
VB(O). The linearity of expected values means that end of period expected values must sat
isfy ExpV(l) ExpVA(l) + ExpVB(l). Expressing this as an expected rate of return yields
(ExpV(l) - V(O)]/V(O) (ExpVA(l) + ExpVB(l) - V(O)]/V(O). Substituting V(O) VA(O) +
VB(O) in the numerator of the right hand side and breaking such side into two fractions
yields the modified right hand side: (ExpVA(l) - VA(O)]/V(O) + (VB(l) - VB(O)]/V(O). But
such terms can then be rewritten in the form [ExpVA(l) - VA(O)]/VA(O) * VA(O)/V(O).
Taken all together, this yields ExpRet(Corporation)
VA(O)/V(O) * ExpRet(A) +
VB(O)/V(O) * ExpRet(B).
=

=

=

=

=
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tax rate, and B , with his 0% tax rate, each hold half of X's capital, total
tax collections are $33.33. Suppose, however, that X can break its capi
tal into two instruments, a safe instrument with an $800 principal
amount paying an expected 8% return and a risky instrument with a
$200 "principal" amount paying an expected 18% return. If A were to
gravitate exclusively to the safe instrument, he would earn an expected
$40 per year. The Fisc's wealth tax collection from A would accord
ingly be $26.67. Since no additional wealth tax would be forthcoming
from B, the Fisc would be a net loser as a result of X's change of capi
tal structure.
But is there any reason to expect that taxpayer preferences might
be such as to create this fiscal quandary (or conversely, to create a fis
58
cal bonanza ) ? Sadly, the answer is yes. The harder question is

58.

Assume investor preferences for an investment are fully determined by such invest
ment's expected return and risk (as measured, for ease of presentation, by the standard de
viation of the investment's returns, though the analysis is identical if the measure is the in
vestment's covariance with the "market" portfolio). A wealth tax imposed at a rate of T on
an instrument's expected returns will reduce the expected return of the instrument from the
pre-tax ExpRet to (1 - T) * ExpRet. But it will leave the standard deviation of the instru
ment's returns unchanged.
It is possible to conceive of investor preferences that will switch the ordering of invest
ments after taking an expected-returns-based wealth tax into account. Under the preferences
illustrated, high risk-reward instruments will migrate into the hands of low tax rate taxpay
ers:
Expected Return

Instrument 1=(µ1,m)

µz

( l -T)µ1

(µ2,(l-T)02)

( 1 -T)µz

Oz

Risk (standard deviation)
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whether tax policymakers can safely ignore such possible second-order
effects.
C.

Consumption Taxes

Consumption taxes are the next installment in the march towards
something that might fairly be termed an interest-holder income tax.
As in the case of wealth taxes, they arguably fit the bill, since a robust
consumption tax scheme, at least when viewed over a long enough
time horizon (that is, the lifetime of the taxpayer), taxes exactly the
entirety of a taxpayer's economic income.
For purposes of this article, I define a consumption-tax scheme as
any scheme which allows for the tax deferred receipt of any corporate
capital income, provided such income is reinvested in other corporate
capital instruments (with the reinvestment option being as broadly or
9
as narrowly defined as desired). 5 Thus, in a loose sense, such schemes
reverse the usual academic inclination (typified by calls for mark-to
market taxation) to conform the taxation of corporate equity to rules
(J(}
somewhat akin to those currently applied to corporate debt. In con
trast, a consumption-tax scheme is one that allows a holder of a corpo
rate debt instrument the same deferral opportunities as holders of eq
uity instruments currently enjoy. The paradigm for such taxation is the
IRA account. Such an account effectively allows the taxpayer to neu
tralize the effects of various realization rules, and thus allows the
holder of a debt instrument to benefit from the same reinvestment of
"undistributed" earnings as the holder of an equity instrument enjoys.
I will say little about possible implementation of consumption-tax
schemes. One could think of allowing taxpayers to designate one or
more accounts which would be taxed as a single aggregate equity in
vestment under current tax rules. At one extreme, the accounts could
be narrowly tailored to include a single instrument, such as a corporate
bond, and to allow reinvestment merely in identical instruments. At
the other extreme, the accounts could be very broad, comprising a
taxpayer's entire portfolio of investments. In either case, however, no
tax consequences would adhere so long as economic returns, whether
interest accruals, cash interest and dividend receipts, or proceeds from
security dispositions, were reinvested in the same account. However, if
and when the taxpayer withdraws funds from the account, he would be

As pictured, u(µ,, a) > u (µ.,, a,), but u((l-T) µ,, a,) < u ((1-T) µ.,, a,). Thus, tax exempt in
vestor B prefers Instrument 1, while taxable investor A prefers Instrument 2.

59. It is immaterial for my purposes whether, as in many consumption tax proposals, a
deduction is allowed to the taxpayer at the time of his initial investment in a corporate capi
tal instrument. Thus, under my definition, both a nondeductible IRA account and a regular
IRA account represent a consumption-tax scheme.
60. In particular, the OID rules.
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taxed on such withdrawal - notionally such withdrawal would be a
"dividend." And upon dissolution of the account, gain or loss could be
tallied and taxed.61
For such a scheme to be capital structure neutral, no post-issuance
strategic behavior on the part of either an issuing corporation or an in
terest holder can affect tax collections. That the corporation's hands
are tied follows from the fact that its capital instruments are buried in
accounts, with interest holder tax results attaching solely to interest
holder actions with respect to such accounts. Thus, for example, a stra
tegic redemption of a capital instrument will not have any tax effect
without additional action on the part of the interest holder.
Eradicating interest holder gamesmanship is therefore the issue.
That is, for a consumption tax scheme to work, one might think that
one needs to attend to such matters as preventing the interest holder
from benefiting from strate�ic dissolutions and reformations of his ac
counts to accelerate losses. 2 But one does not, for such dissolutions
and reformations are independent of the existence of any specific type
of corporate capital in the given account. That is, the mere moving of
capital instruments into accounts which are taxed as accounts will
without more neuter any interest holder tax benefits based on the cor
porate creation of any specific type of corporate capital.
D.

Accretion Taxes

An accretion tax bases tax collections on actual investment per
formance during the period in question. It is exemplified by "economic
accrual" or " mark-to-market" taxation. But it would also include, as
noted in footnote 52, a "wealth" tax measured on the basis of end-of
period wealth.

61. As noted, it does not generally matter whether contributions to an account are tax
deductible. If they are, a certain simplicity obtains, since there is no need for a basis recovery
scheme to be applied to nonliquidating or liquidating distributions. If they are not, a basis
recovery scheme would need to be chosen. But so long as any such scheme creates no oppor
tunity for corporate-interest holder manipulation, and it generally will not, which scheme is
chosen is irrelevant.

62. One simple way to accomplish this (that is, without excessive tracking of investments
and without the implementation of complexities such as the current straddle rules or wash
sale rules) is to have the sum total of all of an interest holder's investments treated as a single
portfolio. Or, depending on one's tolerance of attempted arbitrages across broad classes of
assets, one might go less far. Thus, one might allow a taxpayer to designate multiple portfo
lios so long as such portfolios sufficiently minimize the ability to behave strategically. Portfo
lios based on type of issuer could accomplish this. Thus, a taxpayer might have a portfolio
containing capital instruments issued by C corporations, another containing capital instru
ments issued by single-taxed entities, a third containing government bonds, a fourth con
taining municipal bonds, a fifth with residential real estate, and so on. It should be noted that
capital structure neutrality could be relatively closely approximated without applying a port
folio tax approach to any but the first such portfolio.
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63
Much has been written about the benefits of such taxation. For
purposes of this Article, however, the key point is that an interest
holder tax based on accretion can under certain assumptions be part of
a capital structure neutral corporate taxation scheme. That an interest
holder can not manipulate such a tax should be obvious. For short of
voluntarily sabotaging his actual investment performance (as opposed
to his performance as reflected on a tax return under a tax system such
as ours), there is nothing he can do to reduce the sting of such a tax,
provided, as always, that accurate measurement of fair market value is
possible.
But the analysis is not complete unless there is also nothing a CFO
can do either to steer high expected return instruments into low tax
rate hands, or inadvertently to cause high expected return instruments
to migrate into high tax rate hands. Unfortunately, as was the case
64
with a wealth tax, there may be. Again, the harder question is

63. See, e.g., David J. Shakow, A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1111 (1986); see also Shuldiner, supra note 5.

64. Assume, as in footnote 58, that investor preferences for an investment are fully de
termined by such investment's expected return and the standard deviation of such return. A
tax imposed at a rate of T on an instrument's actual returns will reduce the expected return
of the instrument from the pre-tax ExpRet to (1 - T) * ExpRet. It will also reduce the stan
dard deviation of the instrument's returns from StDev to (1 - T) * StDev.
It is possible to conceive of investor preferences that will switch the ordering of invest
ments after taking a mark-to-market tax into account. For example, as pictured, high risk
reward instruments may migrate into the hands of high tax rate taxpayers. Again, and con
trary to intent, capital structure matters.
Expected Return

Instrument 2 = (µ>,cr2)

Instrument I =(µ1,01)

(1 -T)IU
(l -T)µ1

(( l-T)µ1,(l-T)cri )

(I -T)cr1

(l -T)CJ2
Risk (standard deviation)

As pictured, u(µ,, a,) > u (µ.,, a,), but u((l-T)11i , (1-T)a,) < u ((1-T)µ,, (1-T)a,). Thus, tax ex
empt investor B prefers Instrument 1, while taxable investor A prefers Instrument 2.
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whether such second order effects - even if they could be identified
- should drive the design of a tax system.
PART Y - A DECONSTRUCTION OF THE CORPORATE TAX SCHEME

It is always fun to begin with a tautology. Mine is that any corpo
rate and interest-holder taxation scheme has a deconstruction into the
sum of three separate tax levies:

Levy #1 is a pure corporate-level tax, computed on capital
structure-independent corporate income. Thus, it is the tax im
posed on corporate income computed without any deductions or
other allowances for items which economically represent a return
or payment to any interest holder with respect to such interest
holders' invested capital. Note that this levy, viewed in isolation,
is by definition capital structure neutral.

Levy #2 is a corporation interest-holder tax interface, composed
of the combination of any corporate tax effect - generally a re
and any directly
corresponding interest-holder tax effect - generally an increase
in tax - occasioned by the same capital structure feature. For
example, a corporation's tax savings arising from the corporate
interest expense deduction falls within this levy, while the inter
est holder's tax on the corresponding interest income may or may
not. That is, in order to isolate the effects of capital structure, the
interest holder portion of this levy should be limited to interest
holder taxes which would not have been collected, but for the
capital structure feature that occasioned the corresponding cor
porate tax effect. Thus, if the corporation's interest expense de
duction is for a cash interest payment, no interest holder tax
should be included (provided the interest holder would have paid
a like amount of tax on a dividend), while if the corporation's in
terest deduction is for an OID accrual, the interest holder's tax
on such accrual should be included (unless a like tax would have
been imposed on an equity accrual).

duction in tax - occasioned by capital structure

Levy #3 is the residual interest-holder tax, which - to qualify
this deconstruction as a tautology - must include all other tax
collected from interest holders with respect to such holders' in
vestments in the corporation. For example, since corporate taxes
are not generally effected by dividend payments or shareholder
capital transactions, any tax collected on shareholder dividend
income or capital gains will be part of this levy.
An example will help illustrate this deconstruction. Consider a
corporation X with only debt and equity in its capital structure. X's
earnings before interest and taxes are $100. Assume the corporate tax
rate is 33.33% . Then, the amount of tax X would pay on its income computed in a capital-structure independent manner - is $33.33 (that
is, 33.33% of $100). This is levy #1.
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Suppose, however, that interest is deductible, and that X pays $40
of interest. This payment saves X $13.33 of tax (that is, 33.33 % of $40).
Thus, levy #2 is tentatively -$13.33. In order to determine whether any
thing more need be taken into account, other tax rules must be known.
Suppose that the interest payment is includible in the income of X's
bondholders. Suppose such bondholders pay tax on such interest at a
blended 25% rate. Then $10 of tax is collected as a result of the inter
est payment (that is, 25% of $40). It is tempting to say that levy #2
should be the combination of these two pieces, hence -$3.33 (that is, a
loss of $13.33 of corporate tax revenue and a gain of $10.00 of interest
holder tax revenue). However, the goal is to isolate the effects of the
corporate interest expense deduction. Thus, suppose that X's interest
holders pay tax at a blended 10% rate on any dividends received from
X. In that case, they would have paid $4 of tax with respect to the in
terest receipts, even if such receipts had been denominated a dividend.
Thus, the effect of the corporate capital structure decision - to de
nominate the payment as interest instead of dividend - is an incre
mental $6 of tax collected from the interest holders. So viewed, levy #2
is -$7.33 (i.e., a corporate tax savings of $13.33 with respect to interest
expense, and a bondholder tax increase of $6 with respect to interest
income).
Finally, suppose that X pays out its entire income after interest and
taxes as a dividend. Such dividend would be $40 (that is, $100 of in
come before interest expense, less $40 of interest expense, less $20 of
taxes on the remaining $60 of taxable income). Since this payment did
not affect the corporate tax collection, it has no implications for levy
#2. Rather, its effects are limited to levy #3. Suppose, as noted above,
that shareholders pay tax at a blended 10% rate on dividends. Then
the dividend payment results in $4 of tax (that is, 10% of $40). But re
call that a part of the tax on interest receipts was excluded from levy
#2, since such part would have been collected whether the payment
was denominated interest or dividend. This part totaled $4 as well, and
since it has not previously been taken into account in the deconstruc
tion, it is also definitionally a part of levy #3. Finally, assume all other
interest holder taxes are $0 (for example, there is no capital gains tax
on dispositions of interests). Then levy #3 is $8 (that is, $4 of tax col
lected on a $40 dividend payment, and $4 of tax collected on the $40
interest payment).
PART VI - ALL SOLUTIONS ARE DECOUPLED
In Part IV above, I sketched a number of capital structure neutral
tax regimes. When deconstructed, they have two features in common:

1.

Levy

#2 - that is, the sum of the corporate-level tax effects oc

casioned by capital structure and any directly corresponding
interest-holder tax effects from those very same items - is
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identically zero. This is because in each capital structure neu
tral tax regime sketched in Part IV, there is no corporate-level
tax effect from capital structure at all. Thus, trivially, there is
no corresponding interest-holder tax effect.

2.

In each capital structure neutral tax regime sketched in Part IV,
levy #3
that is, all interest-holder taxes other than those in
cluded in levy #2
is itself capital structure neutral. That is,
ignoring all corporate-level tax effects (levies #1 and #2), there
is no bias in any illustrated tax regime in favor of one financial
-

-

instrument over another.
More, however, is true.

Theorem: Every capital structure neutral corporate tax regime must
have a deconstruction into three levies - as set forth in Part V

-

that

additionally has the two features - items 1 and 2 above - just pos
ited. That is, it must have a deconstruction wherein (1) levy #1 is capi·
tal structure neutral, (2) levy #2 is identically zero, and (3) levy #3 is
capital structure neutral.

The intuition is simple. The sum of things that are capital structure
neutral will itself be capital structure neutral. And if something is
globally capital structure neutral, and one breaks off a subpart which is
capital structure neutral, the remaining piece will be capital structure
65
neutral as well.
More formally, consider any proffered capital structure neutral tax
regime. Since every step of the deconstruction process is well-defined,
such regime will have a unique deconstruction of the form set forth in
Part V above. That is, it will have a derivable levy #1, which is simply
that unique amount of tax which would be collected from the corpora
tion if its taxable income were computed without allowing any effects
66
related to its capital structure. And it will have a derivable levy #2,

65. Cf. Alvin C. Warren Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107
HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993). The centerpiece of the article uses put-call parity to deconstruct a
fixed return as the sum of three random returns. The same can be done here. It is clearly
possible to deconstruct a capital structure neutral tax regime as a sum of tax regimes which
are not themselves capital structure neutral, so long as their failures in that regard perfectly
offset one another. The proffered deconstruction, by lumping together pieces which need to
offset one another, simply brings to light whether the necessary offsets need to be made.

66. It may appear to have multiple such deconstructions. For example, suppose a tax
regime approaches the taxation of debt and equity by deeming debt to have an accrual rate
of 8% and equity to have an accrual rate of 13%. Assume that both interest and dividend
accruals are deductible and includible. Thus, the corporation accrues deductions at 8% or
13%, depending on the type of capital in its capital structure, and the holders accrue income
at the same rate.
There appear to be two natural deconstructions of the resulting tax regime. First, one
could look atthe tax rules and decide that the capital structure independent tax - levy #1 is whatever tax would be imposed if one ignored both the interest and the dividend deduc
tions. Levy #2 would then include the tax effects of both such deductions and presumably
also the tax on the 5% incremental dividend inclusion. Levy #3 would presumably include
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which is the unique sum of (i) any corporate-level tax effect caused
solely by its capital structure and (ii) any directly corresponding
interest-holder tax effect which would not have existed but for this
same item of capital structure. And it will have a derivable levy #3,
which is the unique amount of any residual interest-holder taxes.
Since levy #1 is definitional - and is definitionally capital structure
neutral - it is uninteresting. Suppose levy #2 is not identically zero.
Without loss of generality, suppose for some capital structure that levy
is negative. This would be the case, for example, if interest deduc

#2

tions cost more corporate-level tax revenue than the corresponding in
cremental interest inclusions generate in interest holder tax collections.
A CFO can take advantage of this disparity by placing the favored
form of capital in his capital structure. In a world where nothing but
taxes matters, he will do so, unless the benefit of doing so is out
weighed by other incremental taxes.
Turn now to levy #3. If this levy provides a relative tax advantage
to the same type of capital as levy #2, the CFO has his mandate, the
corporation's capital structure will be loaded up with such capital, the
tax world will not be in equilibrium, and quite clearly, contrary to as
sumption, the tax regime is not capital structure neutral. All the same
is true if levy #3 is itself capital structure neutral. And indeed, all the
same is true if levy #3 disfavors the type of capital favored by levy #2,
provided it does not disfavor it to such an extent as to outweigh the
benefit derived from such capital under levy #2. Finally, if the type of
capital favored by levy #2 is subjected to such a great disadvantage
under levy #3 that the disadvantage actually outweighs the tax saved
by such capital under levy #2, the CFO will, or in any event should,
turn tail and load the corporation's capital structure with the type of
capital disfavored by levy #2. For in that case, on an aggregate basis,
the corporation and its interest holders will be better off.
So the only tax regimes which nullify the CFO's shenanigans are
those in which any benefit achieved by any type of capital with respect

the tax on an 8% accrual by interest holders regardless of the nature of the corporate in
struments they hold.
But this deconstruction would be incorrect. Instead, one needs to observe that the corpo
ration receives an 8% allowance with respect to its invested capital, regardless of the nature
of such capital. Thus, levy #1 should be the tax on corporate income measured after taking
this allowance into account. (The allowance is equivalent to a reduction in the base corpo
rate tax rate.) In that case, levy #2 would only include the tax reduction from the incremental
5% accruing deduction for equity in excess of debt, as well as the tax on the 5% incremental
income inclusion with respect to equity holdings. And levy #3 would still be the tax on the
8% across the board accrual with respect to corporate instruments.
Note that the second - and correct - deconstruction is not made untenable merely be
cause different corporations employ different amounts of capital, and so will have different
"base" tax rates. Capital structure neutrality does not require that there be no differences in
taxation resulting from the amount of capital employed by a corporation, but only that what
ever that amount of capital, there is no difference in taxation based on the tax character of
such capital.
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to levy #2 is exactly offset by a detriment caused by such type of capital
with respect to levy #3. But in such case, it is a trivial matter to prop
erly identify the incremental detriment with respect to levy #3 as being
directly related to the capital causing the incremental benefit with re
.
spect to levy #2, and so to rewrite the deconstruction with levy #2 as
including both the detriment and the benefit and so as being identi
cally equal to zero. And once so rewritten, what remains as levy #3
must be capital structure neutral, for otherwise there will again be op
portunities for the CFO, and this time without any remaining tax im
positions to offset such opportunities. Thus, any capital structure neu
tral tax regime must have a deconstruction of the proffered type.
QED.
PART VII - IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CORPORATE
INTEREST DEDUCTION
Subject to a myriad of exceptions, Code Section 163(a) allows any
taxpayer - entity or individual - a deduction for "all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." This provision has
been a part of the Code since the inception of the modern income tax
67
in 1913. No explanation for the original provision was provided; pre
sumably none was needed.
Although predating the Haig-Simons definition of personal in
come, the deduction for interest expense squares neatly with such
68
definition. An amount paid or accrued to a third party creditor is
hard to shoehorn into consumption (although if the borrowing was to
finance consumption, such an argument can be attempted) and is im
possible to shoehorn into wealth accretion. Indeed, for an individual
conducting a trade or business, any payment or accrual to any third
party provider of labor or capital, however denominated, constitutes
neither consumption (except perhaps in a disguised gift context) nor
wealth accretion, and so should be a Haig-Simons deduction.
But while this makes perfect sense for individuals, it makes not a
69
whit of sense for corporations. A corporation as such neither engages
in consumption nor possesses any wealth, accreting or otherwise. In
stead, what appears to be its wealth is merely a reserve against the un
70
liquidated claims of various capital providers. Some of the capital

67. Section II(G)(b) of the Income Tax Act of 1913.

68.

HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION

61-62 (1938).

69. That the corporate analysis of interest deductions does not track the individual
analysis was already clear when the original corporate interest deduction of 1913 was en
acted; the deduction for interest expense was limited to an amount of interest accrued and
paid on debt representing one-half of the capitalization of the corporation. See Section
II(G)(b) of the Income Tax Act of 1913.
70. These claims include those of involuntary capital providers such as tort creditors.
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providers appear higher on the right side of the balance sheet than
others; some are left off altogether. But ultimately it is they, and not
the corporation, who own the corporation's apparent wealth, and so it
is to them that any accretion in such wealth belongs. Thus it is at best a
mystery why income tax regimes have generally allowed corporations
to treat payments or accruals to creditors in a fundamentally different
- and inconsistent - way from payments or accruals to equity pro
viders.
This is not to say that a capital structure neutral tax regime cannot
contain an interest deduction. It can. The more salient question is
whether it should. An example will help illustrate. Suppose that a tax
regime is implemented that extracts tax at a rate of 33.33 % on corpo
rate income and further extracts tax at a uniform rate of 25 % on all in
terest holders' mark-to-market gains. Suppose that the goal is to insti
tute a corporate interest expense deduction that does not deprive the
regime of capital structure neutrality. Accordingly, all necessary ad
j ustments will be undertaken to retain such neutrality.
In a given year, assume that corporation X has $100 of capital
71
structure independent income and $300 of unrealized appreciation.
As the tax legislator, I begin with a deconstruction of X's tax results as
set forth in Part V above. Thus, levy #1 is a corporate tax of $33.33
(that is, 33.33% of $100). Levy #2 is tentatively zero, both because it
must be so in order to have capital structure neutrality and because
X's capital structure has not yet been set. Finally, levy #3, the interest
holder tax, is $91.67 (that is, 25 % on $366.67 of appreciation, where
the $366.67 is itself composed of $66.67 of X's after-tax taxable income
and $300 of X's unrealized appreciation).
My goal as tax legislator is to give X an interest deduction. So sup
pose that X pays $50 of interest to A and that such payment is de
ductible. Suppose further that A is taxed at a 25 % rate on the interest
received, either as an application of the general mark-to-market tax or
in lieu of the mark-to-market tax. The tax effects are as follows. X's
taxable income declines from $100 to $50, so the Fisc's tax collection
from X falls from $33.33 to $16.67. In addition, A pays $12.50 of tax on
the interest received (that is, 25 % of $50).
What are the implications for the deconstruction? Levy #1 is capi
tal structure independent, and so is unchanged at $33.33. Levy #2 is
now negative $16.67, representing X's tax savings of $16.67 in respect
of its interest deduction. Note that A's tax payment of $12.50 on his
interest income is not included in levy #2, since such tax payment is
not affected by the fact of X's interest payment. Rather, A pays a 25%

71.

The unrealized appreciation is assumed to be an after-corporate tax number, so that
the interests of X's capital providers increase in value by exactly this amount. Perhaps the
simplest way to think about this is as the increase in value of X's goodwill, which for pur
poses of the example, X will never alienate.
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tax on the $50 in question whether such amount represents a deducti
ble interest payment, a nondeductible dividend payment, or even j ust
unrealized appreciation in A's instrument. Thus, A's $12.50 tax pay
ment on his interest income is part of the general interest holder tax in
levy #3. And accordingly, levy #3 is $95.83, which is the sum of the tax
collection of $12.50 from A on his interest receipt and a tax collection
of $83.33 from X's equity owners with respect to the appreciation in
the value of their X stock (that is, 25% of $333.33, which is now com
posed of $33.33 of X's income after interest and taxes and $300 of X's
unrealized asset appreciation).
This taxation scheme is not capital structure neutral. Specifically,
although levy #3 satisfies the requirements for a suitable interest
holder tax, levy #2 does not. Fortunately, as the tax legislator, I can
easily "fix" this tax regime. I simply impose an incremental interest
holder tax of 33.33% on interest income. If this were done, A would
pay an incremental $16.67 in respect of the interest received (33.33 %
of $50). Levy #2 would then be zero, as required. That almost restores
capital structure neutrality, but not quite. If A is still required to pay
the mark-to-market tax on the entire $50 of interest received, debt will
be over-taxed relative to equity. Thus, the mark-to-market tax must
include an allowance (a deduction) for the incremental tax paid on in
terest income. Thus, A's income with respect to the interest payment
for mark-to-market tax purposes is only $33.33, representing the $50
of interest received less the incremental $16.67 of taxes paid in respect
of such interest. So refined, levy #3 would pick up $8.33 of taxes from
A (that is, 25 % of $33.33 of net interest receipts) and $83.33 of taxes
from X's equity holders (exactly as above). This is exactly the same net
result as in the capital structure neutral regime I started with, but now
in a world with a corporate interest deduction.
Before one shouts hallelujah at the saving of the corporate interest
deduction - although query whether one should want to go through
such contortions to save it - it should be noted that true salvation is
not to be had. At least not if the model is complicated by allowing for
interest holders with multiple tax rates.
For example, assume that X has two "equal" interest holders, A,
with a 40% tax rate on mark-to-market income, and B, with a 10% tax
rate on such income. Merely having interest holders with such multiple
tax rates does not in and of itself scuttle capital structure neutrality.
For so long as each taxpayer, whatever his tax rate, has no tax-related
preference for one type of corporate capital instrument over another,
the tax regime can still be capital structure neutral. The problem is to
ensure that taxpayers will be indifferent.
To properly model B as a quasi-proxy for a tax-exempt taxpayer, it
is critical to further assume that A's incremental tax rate with respect
to deductible corporate interest income is also higher than B 's: assume
also four times higher than B 's. Since the average rate for the incre-
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33.33%,

A's tax rate must be

53.33%

and B 's must

be 13.33% . This rate structure would produce a neatly capital struc
ture neutral tax regime, provided either that A's and B's relative pref
erences for X's securities are identical, or that there is otherwise a
mechanism to force each of A and B to hold identical portfolios of X's
securities. Since the second alternative is anathema to a free market,
one must hope to rely on the first. But one can not.
If A were the sole owner of all of X's securities, X would issue only
equity securities. This is because the effective tax rate on corporate in
come paid to A as a debt holder is 53.33% , while the effective tax rate
on corporate income paid to A as an equity holder is only 33.33% . On
the other hand, if B were the sole owner of all of X's securities, X
would issue - to the extent possible - only debt securities. This is
because the effective tax rate on corporate income paid to B as a debt
holder is 13.33%, while the effective tax rate on corporate income paid
to B as an equity holder is 33.33%. Thus, in a world peopled with both
A and B, A will purchase (to the extent possible) only equity securities
72
and B will purchase (to the extent possible) only debt securities. And
so the blended incremental tax rate on the interest paid by the debt se
curities will not be 33.33 % as required, but something much lower
(and, in the limit, 13.33% ).
Moreover, this same conclusion will hold whenever the incre
mental tax on interest income is imposed at a non-uniform rate. To
those who pay an incremental tax at a rate above the corporate tax
rate (that is, are subject to a negative tax arbitrage with respect to the
corporation's interest payments), X will offer equity instruments with
a lower yield than its debt instruments, but with a higher after-tax re
turn. And to those who pay an incremental tax at a rate below the cor
porate tax rate, X will offer debt instruments both with a higher yield
than its equity instruments, and with a higher after-tax return. So tax
clienteles will form. And capital structure will most decidedly not be
neutral.
Unless, of course, one discards the assumption that the incremental
tax is imposed at a non-uniform rate. That is, the unraveling of capital
structure neutrality in the world with a corporate interest deduction
resulted solely from the assumption that all of A's tax rates had to be
higher (indeed, four tunes higher) than those of B. If, instead, I had

72. An alternative way to see this is as follows: Since X pays a 33.33% tax on income
distributed to equity holders but a 0% tax on income distributed to debt, it is indifferent be
tween issuing a preferred stock paying 10% or some junior debt paying 15%. If A purchases
the preferred stock, he pays tax of 25% and so has an after-all-tax yield of 7.5%. If he pur
chases the debt, he pays both an incremental tax of 53.33% and the mark-to-market tax of
25% and so has an after-all-tax yield of 5.25 %. Thus, he prefers the equity. Conversely, B's
after-all-tax yield on the equity is 9% and his after-all-tax yield on the debt is 11.7%. Thus,
he prefers the debt.
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imposed a blanket tax of 33.33 % on all interest receipts, whether those
of A or of B, capital structure neutrality would be restored.
But this precisely demonstrates the silliness of incorporating a cor
porate interest deduction into a capital structure neutral tax regime. In
a capital structure neutral world with multiple interest holder tax rates,
a corporate interest deduction must be exactly reversed by an incre
mental single-rate interest holder tax on interest income. Thus, there
can be a corporate interest deduction in form only, not in substance.
And since having such a deduction does little for the virtues one wants
from a tax system - simplicity, transparency, aesthetics, easy collecti
bility - one should simply dispense with it.
And one should dispense with its kin as well. That is, whenever a
corporation is allowed a deduction in respect of a return - explicit or
implicit - to any capital interest holder (broadly defined), all of the
73
foregoing analysis applies. Prominent examples include deductions
for interest-like accruals imbedded in lease payments or deferred
compensation arrangements and deductions for participation disguised
as compensation (e.g., employee stock options) or as royalties.
PART VIII - CONCLUSION
Having seen what is required - structurally - to achieve a capital
structure neutral corporate tax system, it remains to demonstrate
briefly that a change to such a system would be worthwhile. Part II
above enumerated certain benefits of having such a system. But the
biggest benefit, I think, would be the potential tax rate reductions that
could accompany a change to a capital structure neutral tax system. In
the following paragraphs, I assume that such a tax system would com
bine a corporate-level tax on corporate taxable income (as currently
defined, but without allowances based on capital structure) and an in
terest holder tax on mark-to-market capital income.
It is an empirical question as to exactly how low the corporate tax
rate could go if one wanted to preserve at current levels corporate tax
collections in a regime of - or more likely approaching - capital
structure neutrality. The first iteration - the denial of a corporate de
duction with respect to interest expense - would have increased the
74
The actual tax
corporate tax base by $771 billion, or 120 % , in 1996.
base, $640 billion, generated $224 billion in taxes, before taking credits
into account. Thus, the corporate tax rate could have been reduced

73. For the breadth of term capital interest holder, and the variety of forms that such
returns can take, see Schlunk, NQPS, supra note 14.
74. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS ON INCOME (1996). The percentage is as
measured against income subject to tax, which totaled $640 billion.

450
from 35 % to

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:410

16% without any loss of revenue to the FISC.75 Such a sig

nificant reduction in the corporate marginal tax rate should without
more have the salutary effect of spurring corporate economic activity.
It would further have the effect of reducing the marginal benefit of
corporate tax shelters, and hence their prevalence.
Similarly, it is an empirical question as to how low interest holder
tax rates could go if one wanted to preserve current interest holder tax
76
collections, but in a mark-to-market setting. The first iteration would
observe that personal interest (not all of which is corporate) and divi
77
dend receipts totaled $270 billion, or 10.5% of AGI, in 1996. Taxes
78
on this amount totaled $69 billion. Net realized capital gains, in turn,
totaled $252 billion, and at a presumed 20% tax rate generated $50
billion of tax revenues. Assuming, admittedly arbitrarily, that realized
capital gains on average reflect 50% of annually accrued capital gains,
the tax base for mark-to-market capital gains would have been $504
billion in 1996. Thus, a single individual interest holder tax rate of 15%
o n mark-to-market corporate capital income could have been imposed
79
without any net revenue loss to the Fisc. Taxing all corporate capital
returns at such rate, rather than taxing some such returns at markedly

·

lower (0% ) or higher (39.6%) rates, should generally prove beneficial
to the economy, and at the very least, would eliminate heroic attempts
both to achieve deferral and to convert ordinary income into capital
gain.
But, finally, a word of caution. Given political realities, it is unlikely that a move all the way to capital structure neutrality is feasible.
If only a partial move is made - for example, abolishing the corporate
interest expense deduction or taxing publicly-traded securities on a
mark-to-market basis - there will be a need to compare the benefits
of the move against its costs. In particular, such a partial move, by re-

75. This rate reduction is meant to be provocative; the actual reduction would be lower
(albeit still significant). I mentioned at the outset that consolidation issues would not be
taken into account in this Article, but here they need to be. Thus, if the goal is to tax corpo
rate income once and only once, then any consolidation scheme must insure that interest
paid by one corporation to another has no net effect on the corporate tax base. Thus, the
amount of the interest expense deduction which is relevant is not the entire $771 billion, but
merely the portion of such amount paid to persons other than domestic C corporations.

76. Cf Weisbach, supra note 10 (discussing the possibility of taxing different types of
income - for example, mark-to-market returns with respect to publicly traded instruments
and more traditional returns with respect to nonpublicly traded instruments - at different
rates, with the goal of taxing each at the same effective rate).
77. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics on Income - 1996. I have backed $252 billion of
capital gains out of taxable income of $3090 billion, leaving $2838 billion of non-capital gain
taxable income.
78. This assumes that tax receipts from interest and dividend income are proportional to
tax receipts from other types of income. In fact, they are probably somewhat higher.

79. 15% of $272 billion of interest and dividends and $504 billion of capital gains equals
the actually collected tax of $119 billion.
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taining inefficiencies, would have costs that may or may not outweigh
the benefits of the move. It is my sense that the benefits would swamp
the costs, but a more thorough analysis would need to be undertaken
to confirm this.

